The Seila Program in Cambodia by Hughes, C.
Cambodia’s Seila program emerged in a context in which conflict was
ongoing and political and economic reforms were at an early stage. At the
national level, political conflict remained intense, while on the ground,
almost 90 percent of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture
amid physical, political, and economic insecurity. The rural economy was
characterized by shattered infrastructure that inhibited access to markets
and services, unclear land rights and widespread land-grabbing, and a
largely nonexistent private sector offering little off-farm employment.
Throughout the 1990s, natural resources, particularly forests and fishing
lots, were rapidly privatized through nontransparent means, with disas-
trous implications for the incomes of the landless and the poor.
In terms of governance, the picture was murky. In the 1980s, Cambodia’s
provinces were governed by provincial administrations, with a great deal of
de facto autonomy from the center. This autonomy was not a product of a
federal regime but rather of the lack of infrastructure, poor telecommuni-
cations, and difficulty of travel. With the overhaul of the state apparatus
after 1993, following the promulgation of a new Constitution, rapid cen-
tralization of powers occurred. Subsequently, the government announced a
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desire to decentralize power once again, although no organic law yet exists
identifying the structure, functions, or revenue-raising powers of different
layers.
In the provinces, government is organized through a number of vertical
structures. The central administrative structure is the provincial adminis-
tration, under an appointed governor, who oversees the offices of the
various district chiefs. District chiefs oversee a system of communes,
the lowest layer of government. Before 2002 appointed chiefs headed
communes. In 2002 the first commune elections took place to choose
multimember commune councils from party lists in a proportional repre-
sentation system. Cambodia’s ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party,
won a landslide victory in these elections, although almost all commune
councils have representatives from more than one party.
Below the commune is the village, headed by a village chief who
receives a stipend from the commune, although his role is not recognized
in the Constitution as that of a government official. Research has shown
that for most rural Cambodians, the village is the only sphere of society,
the economy, or politics in which villagers take much interest or about
which they have much knowledge (Biddulph 2001,14). Commune
government is frequently referred to as a monolithic tnak loeu (higher
level), although attitudes toward the commune level may be changing as
a result of the recent commune elections.
The functions of these layers of government are complicated by the
existence alongside them of provincial and district departments of various
line ministries, such as rural development, planning, agriculture, forestry
and fisheries, education, and health. The horizontal coordination between
these line ministries is highly variable and generally poor. Complicating
matters further, the Ministry of Health administers health districts that
are not coextensive with administrative districts, while ministries such
as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and the Ministry
of Rural Development, which engage in natural resource management,
frequently deal with resources, such as forests and fisheries that are
common to a number of villages or communes.
In the northwest of the country, where the programs that culminated
in Seila originated, are a number of so-called “reconciliation zones”—
zones previously administered by insurgents of the National Army of
Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) that have been reintegrated. In these
zones, commune and district officials are often former NADK cadres,
retained in their administrative roles. In the early 1990s, these provinces
accepted large numbers of refugees returning from border refugee camps,
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where many had lived since the late 1970s or early 1980s. Warfare
continued until 1999, leaving landmines and a devastated economy. This
setting provided the context for the Seila program.
This chapter is based on three sources of information. The main source
is documentary evidence, gained from the comprehensive literature of
research studies, evaluation reports, and project documents collected by
Seila over the years (these sources are available online at http://www.seila.
gov.kh). A second source is a series of interviews with representatives of
donor organizations, NGOs, ministries, and Seila officials that was con-
ducted in Phnom Penh in September and October 2004. A third source is
discussions with representatives of the provincial government and com-
mune councils, which were conducted during two brief field trips to
Kompong Cham and Pursat Provinces in October 2004.
The Seila Program’s Evolving Goals and Objectives
The Seila program was established in 1996, initially as a framework
for matching the delivery of capital for infrastructural projects from a
variety of donors and the national government with local, participa-
tory needs assessments in five provinces in Cambodia. Since 2001 the
program’s goal has been redefined in order to integrate it with the
government’s decentralization and deconcentration reforms, under
which a three-tiered system of planning and budgeting—focusing on
the commune/sangkat, province/municipality, and national levels—
was created.1
Resources mobilized or programmed under the Seila framework are
channeled through annual planning processes and horizontal and vertical
consultations at the commune, district, province, and national levels.
The resources are then systematically transferred to national ministries
and institutions, provinces, and commune/sangkat councils, which are
responsible for implementing a wide range of services and investments
in accordance with their respective mandates.
The Cambodian government’s Seila program document of December
2000 defines it as “a national effort to achieve poverty reduction through
improved local governance.” As such, it incorporates three goals:
• alleviating poverty, by delivering discretionary budgetary support for
provincial and commune authorities to provide basic infrastructure and
services at the village level, which are in compliance with participatory
systems of planning and prioritization, and are implemented locally
• strengthening institutions at the provincial and commune levels, by
providing technical assistance in managing the administration and
financing participatory development schemes
• piloting and experimenting with models of decentralization and
deconcentration in support of government policy for wider initiatives
in this area
The program’s outputs are as follows:
• provision of efficient and effective public goods and services for local
development
• effective implementation of strengthened local institutions and of
decentralized and deconcentrated systems 
• improvement of national policy and regulations for decentralization
and deconcentration (UNDP 2001a)
A central concept behind Seila’s strategy is the notion of good gov-
ernance, which is regarded as a prerequisite for poverty reduction and
sustainable development. Good governance encompasses these:
• local democratic institutions (both representative and participatory)
that provide opportunities for citizens (including the poor and margin-
alized) to be actively involved in local decision making and in the
monitoring and auditing of local public expenditures
• local administrations with greater development and services responsi-
bilities and with correspondingly greater autonomy, resources, and
capacities to adopt their own poverty alleviation policies and to deliver
their benefits 
• effective and efficient partnership arrangements for development
management and service delivery between central and local authorities,
civil society organizations, and the private sector (UNDP 2001b)
Strengthening governance has involved developing procedures for pro-
curement, participatory planning, financing, and public–private partner-
ships in local development projects; training staff at the provincial and
commune levels in implementing these procedures; and establishing
teams of facilitators to monitor their implementation on an ongoing basis.
More broadly, it has involved establishing a framework for disbursing
donor funds through subnational state agencies, giving these agencies
the resources, discretion, and capacity to take a leading role in promoting
participatory development practices.An important indicator of the success
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of the program is the fact that this funding framework has attracted
significant interest from donors, who have increasingly channeled their
contributions through the Seila framework.
If one is to appreciate the significance of the program’s achievements,
it is important to note that these objectives were not explicit in the pro-
gram’s initial design. Rather, they developed along the way, in the light of
experience and necessity. Several aspects of the Seila program emerged
almost by chance, which is significant in terms of the implications for the
design of similar programs. In characterizing the Seila program, then, one
must take account of the development in the program’s scope and objec-
tives, as well as its changing institutional structure.
Seila emerged from an initial effort, by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), to channel funds for repairing infrastructure and
improving services to areas in Northwest Cambodia where former refugees
were being repatriated under the Cambodian peace process of 1991–93.
UNDP had accumulated 16 years of funding for Cambodia, funds that
needed to be spent. In a project titled the Cambodia Area Rehabilitation
and Regeneration Project (CARERE 1), it focused on providing quick-
impact projects to benefit communities to which refugees were returning.
Many aspects of these projects were unsuccessful, particularly in promot-
ing the local ownership necessary to render the infrastructure projects
delivered sustainable. However, this program laid the groundwork for Seila
by getting development workers on the ground in five provinces; giving
them experience in working with the state apparatus in these areas; and, in
one province, permitting experimentation in participatory planning by
creating elected village development committees, a concept that was taken
up in the next phase of the project.
CARERE 2, which ran from 1996 to 2000, built on CARERE 1, with
some key differences. It set out to provide long-term frameworks for
planning and development rather than short-term emergency response
and humanitarian relief. CARERE 1 was a traditional project, in which
local structures were largely bypassed to deliver goods to the local
population. This approach was altered in 1996, when CARERE 2 was
established, as a support project to a set of government development
activities, themselves organized through the Seila program. CARERE
2 replaced emergency relief and infrastructure delivery for resettled
people with experimentation in decentralized local development and
reconciliation. The Seila half of the program entailed the establishment
of planning and development mechanisms within government for the
spending of funds allocated by donors. The CARERE 2 half of the
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program lent support that emphasized capacity building for the govern-
ment officials involved with Seila.
Initially, the objectives of CARERE 2 were framed as follows:
• build capacity in the five provinces for integrated area development
planning
• build capacity for Seila to mobilize and manage financial resources
• build capacity for Seila to perform activities related to the whole project
cycle
• improve the socioeconomic well-being of the population in target
zones
• establish a comprehensive documentary resource base on the Seila
experience
After a mid-term evaluation in July 1998, these objectives were rearticu-
lated as follows:
• establish decentralized government systems that plan, finance, and
manage development
• create a secure environment conducive to reconciliation between
government and communities
• assist government and nongovernment entities in providing essential
basic services
• inform national policy on decentralized development with lessons from
the CARERE/Seila experience
The changing focus suggested by these alterations in objectives reflect-
ed growing awareness that the strength of the program lay in its relation-
ship with government and its ability to promote changing governmental
attitudes, increase government effectiveness, and provide the means for
experimenting with new forms of local governance. Thus, the goals of the
program changed: in 1996 CARERE 2 was envisaged as a program to alle-
viate poverty and to contribute to the building of peace through capaci-
ty building in the state apparatus. By 1998, the goal had become broader
and the vision of reformed governance more ambitious. The notion that
CARERE itself should deliver improved standards of living had fallen
away entirely. Instead, it was seen as supporting government in raising liv-
ing standards. In addition, issues of participation and state-society rela-
tions had entered the program’s central rationale, giving the program
more of a specifically political agenda. Seila now aimed—through support
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for decentralized governance—to contribute to poverty alleviation and
spread of peace in Cambodia, by strengthening the bonds linking civil soci-
ety to the structures of the state and by empowering the Cambodian rural
population to become fully participating members in the development
process (Rudengren and Ojendal 2002, 6).
CARERE ended in 2001. The Seila program continued, supported by
a new multidonor support program called the Partnership for Local
Governance (PLG), established in 2001. Seila’s new objectives focused
primarily on instituting decentralized systems and strategies for poverty
alleviation through good governance.
The PLG project document emphasizes that the significance of
Seila, from a donor perspective, is that it focuses on the policy and
institutional environment of poverty reduction, which is neglected by
many stand-alone projects. The central concern of Seila is to support
provincial and commune planning and coordination mechanisms.
This support is achieved through provision of budgets and support
for experimentation in developing new procedures. It describes Seila
as a program to
provide subnational (provincial and commune) authorities with some reg-
ular general purpose financial transfers (the Local Development Fund and
Provincial Investment Fund) that would support . . . the practical experi-
mentation and adoption, by the same local authorities, of technically sound
and participatory planning, programming and budgeting practices. Such
practices are meant to be institutionally sustainable, which is potentially
statutory (nationally/locally regulated) and independent from specific/
sectoral, domestic or external funding sources. They are in turn expected to
provide the supporting framework for . . . subnational decision making and
accountability on the allocation of resources and actual implementation, of
multiple, centrally funded and monitored, sectoral or purpose-specific
development programs (PLG 2001,11–12).
By this time, Seila was viewed primarily as a program aimed at
reforming local governance. It was also being increasingly used as a
mechanism for channeling and coordinating broader, sector-specific
donor assistance, although this was seen as supplementary to the core
function. To a great extent, Seila was being promoted as the future of
Cambodian local government and as the testing ground for the policies
of decentralization and deconcentration of government function that by
2001—with the first local elections looming—were very much on the
political agenda.2
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Structures of the Seila Program
The decentralized governance system that was put in place created govern-
ment structures at the national, provincial, district, commune, and village
levels. Initially, this was done in the four provinces in the northwest
where the concentration of refugees was greatest. Subsequently, as the
passage of time reduced the saliency of the issue of refugee reintegration
and as enthusiasm for Seila grew among donors and within powerful sec-
tions of government, Seila was expanded. It now covers all provinces of
Cambodia.
Seila consists of a structure of institutions and a set of processes
(figure 4.1). The structure focuses on the provincial and commune levels,
although it operates under a national task force and reaches through the
district level down to the village level. The Seila Task Force, comprising
delegates from seven ministries—Economics and Finance, Agriculture,
Planning, Rural Development, Water Resources, Women’s Affairs, and
Veteran’s Affairs—is responsible for overall policy making with regard to
Seila. It is supported by a national secretariat and is responsible for mobi-
lizing and coordinating aid, allocating funds, and conducting the overall
monitoring and evaluation of the program. The secretariat executes the
Seila program through contracts with provincial governments and rele-
vant line ministries. It has 20 professional staff members.
The provincial level is the highest level at which planning of projects
occurs. A provincial rural development committee is established, chaired by
the governor of the province, and including the directors of key line depart-
ments within the Ministries of Rural Development, Planning, Finance,
Agriculture, Women’s Affairs, and Veteran’s Affairs and the representatives
from districts in the province. The Provincial Rural Development Com-
mittee makes overall plans for development at the provincial level, through
the Provincial Development Plan, and establishes budgets for the plan with
the assistance of a Provincial Investment Fund. Implementation of the plans
is the responsibility of the Executive Committee (ExCom), which is chaired
by the governor. This committee is made up of the directors of the line
departments. It is supported by a secretariat with four units: a contract
administration unit, a technical support unit, a finance unit, and a local
administration unit, which fields provincial and district facilitation
teams to assist in the overall process. The units report to ExCom and
deliver services to the commune development committees. Advisors
from the PLG support project assist these provincial structures.
The next key level of management of development is the commune
level. A commune development committee uses participatory processes
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to develop a commune needs assessment and a commune development
plan. This plan is then taken to the district level for an “integration
workshop,” during which the various commune plans are coordinated
and prioritized and funding is sought, either from the provincial level or
from NGOs, donors, or line departments. A small amount of funds is
also available directly to communes through the Commune/Sangkat
Fund. In 2002, when local elections were held in Cambodia, the commune
development committee was replaced by the commune council’s
Planning and Budgeting Subcommittee, a committee working in conjunc-
tion with elected commune councils. In the original Seila provinces, the
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Figure 4.1 Institutional Structure of the Seila Program
Source: Adapted from Rudengren and Ojendal (2002), appendix 2.
community development committees worked with village development
committees to establish needs and action plans. However, the election
of commune councils and the understanding that the commune level will
be the lowest level of government to which decentralization will extend
has meant that village development committees must remain informal
and be program creations rather than elements of government.
Alongside these governmental structures exists a support structure of
advisors and facilitators, originally established as CARERE 2 in 1996.They
include a provincial office with its own staff, many of them expatriates.
Gradually, expatriates were replaced by national staff, so that by the end
of CARERE 2, in 2000, all support staff were nationals. After 2001, the
CARERE offices were integrated into the provincial administration.
Support to Seila is now delivered through the four secretariat units and
through PLG advisors, who support the provincial administration in man-
agement, finance, planning, monitoring, local capacity building, and infra-
structure as well as in specific sectors, such as agriculture. PLG staff work
with the Seila units in the provincial administration to provide support to
commune councils and to offer capacity building to provincial staff.
There are currently 176 PLG staff working at the provincial level, rang-
ing from 2 in the municipality of Kep to 25 in Ratanakiri Province. The
mid-term review of Seila/PLG describes the PLG support staff as “the
keystone for the whole support structure.” The staff are described as not
merely providing technical advice but also “ensuring sound management,
transparency and accountability—in short, good governance” (UNDP/
DFID/SIDA 2004, 13–14).
The Seila Process
The Seila program entails processes at a number of levels. It has devel-
oped specific procedures for participatory planning and for management
of provincial and commune development. These procedures are codified
in manuals for use by local authorities and facilitated by the provincial
and district facilitation teams attached to the Seila secretariat in each
province. The procedures include both participatory needs assessments
and planning processes, which are designed to bring ordinary villagers into
the process of development, and transparent mechanisms for the dis-
bursement of funds provided by donors.
The key funds provided at the provincial level are the Provincial
Investment Fund and provincial operational budgets, composed
entirely of donor funding and consequently “off budget” as far as the
national treasury is concerned. Since 2002, a proportion of funds has
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also been channeled to the Commune/Sangkat Fund, which is
financed by external grants and loans and by annual national budget
appropriations.
The process of bringing villagers’ ideas into contact with donors’
money requires an intermediate coordination mechanism, which will
allow the provincial level of government to retain oversight over the var-
ious projects, funds, and activities pursued at the commune level and to
prioritize projects across communes and districts. In an 11–step process,
commune councils develop their own three-year investment plans and
five-year development plans.They then draw annual priorities from plans,
which are submitted to district planning units.At the same time, line min-
istries at the provincial level prepare their own work plans. All of these
plans are brought together at the annual district integration workshop, in
which commune, district, and provincial representatives meet, along with
nongovernmental and international organizations planning to work in the
province. Priorities and distributions of resources are determined, as com-
munes present their needs, line ministries and other organizations select
activities to support, and temporary contracts between the two sides are
signed. These agreements then feed into provincial and district planning
for the year.
Seila has also developed processes for building capacity in order to
enable local government institutions to become adept at using the planning
and management procedures. An important element of this approach has
been the notion of learning-by-doing. The process has involved what one
evaluation team described as a leap of faith—the willingness to commit
funds to government structures that had not yet proved their capacity to
use them in a manner that accorded with donor conceptions of good
practice. In the context of early postwar Cambodia, where the state was
widely and to a great extent accurately regarded as abusive, corrupt, and
politically biased, this leap of faith was unusual among donors. The Seila
program gave these state structures the opportunities to reform and, in
particular, to become more responsive to their constituents precisely
because it gave them funds with which to deliver government services.
The procedures used by advisors under CARERE and subsequently
the PLG staff for planning and managing development and for capacity
building within government have also been subject to a learning-by-doing
creed. Seila has been notable for its flexibility and for its willingness to
adapt, experiment, and reform. This flexibility has been built into the
program through continuous monitoring and evaluation, both internal
and external, and through operational feedback.
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Development Results
The Seila program evolved away from the original CARERE 1 orienta-
tion of delivering quick-impact infrastructure and services toward
support of poverty alleviation by reforming the institutions and proce-
dures of local government. Analyzing the program’s delivered
outcomes, then, requires attention to both its impact on poverty allevi-
ation and its impact on local governance. Addressing the question of
spillover in this context is problematic, because an early spillover—the
changing of attitudes locally and centrally toward appropriate methods
of government and the nature of state-society relations—was swiftly
adopted as a goal of the program. Furthermore, the program has increas-
ingly been pitched as a framework for experimentation and data collec-
tion, which can support wider government policy making. By this
means, further spillovers are co-opted as delivered outcomes, making
spillovers and intended results difficult to distinguish. Consequently,
this section addresses the results of the Seila program in terms of the
nature of successes claimed, the impact on poverty and the poor, the
impact on local government, and the impact on central government,
attempting in each case to illuminate the relationship between intend-
ed and unintended outcomes.
Several far-reaching evaluations of Seila have declared the program an
unusual success in the Cambodian context. One study concluded that
Seila “has succeeded in being a development program . . . while at the
same time having a progressive and profound long-term policy impact for
the future of public administration and development in Cambodia . . . .
Here is an example of how aid always was supposed to work, but in
reality rarely did” (Rudengren and Ojendal 2002, 1).
A 2002 evaluation of CARERE 2/Seila (Evans and others 2000) listed
a wide-ranging set of positive outcomes, which included these:
• developing and making operational a concept for regional and local
planning and development
• making substantial progress toward building sustainable capacity at the
province, district, and community levels in five provinces
• visibly changing attitudes toward democratic values and good
governance, including increasing the activism, self-reliance, and self-
esteem of communities that were formerly passive recipients of
assistance
• increasing the responsiveness and self-reliance of provincial and district
government staff and strongly influencing central government policy
on deconcentration and particularly decentralization
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• providing an effective mechanism for approaching former Khmer
Rouge communities and dealing with ethnic diversity in pursuit of the
government’s reconciliation efforts
• delivering essential basic services to needy communities in more than
2,000 villages
• attracting funding from a range of donors
Some of these outcomes are incontrovertible. Seila processes for
planning and managing development are being implemented in a num-
ber of Cambodian provinces. Seila has attracted funding and passionate
commitment from a range of donors, including various UN agencies, the
World Bank, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA),
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID),
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA), and others. Funding chan-
neled through Seila has increased from $12 million in 1996 to $23 million
in 2003; funding from various donors from CARERE 1 to the end of
CARERE 2 also rose (tables 4.1 and 4.2). Some of Cambodia’s largest bilat-
eral donors—notably the Japanese and French governments and the
European Union—have chosen not to direct funding primarily through Seila.
Other claims of success require closer analysis. Chief among them is
the extent of the contribution Seila has made to its overall goals of reduc-
ing poverty and improving governance.
Impact on Poverty Reduction and Aid to the Poor
Seila delivered essential basic service to poor communities in more than
200 villages, an achievement that Evans and others (2000) consider a
major success. Between 1996 and 2000, more than $75 million worth of
technical and program support and investments in local services and
infrastructure was channeled through the program, by 11 multilateral
and bilateral donors, the central government, and NGOs. Since 2000, the
scope of Seila has widened to cover the entire country, and more money
has been plowed into the system.
Other evaluators have been more circumspect in attributing success
in this respect. Rudengren and Ojendal, for example, note that although
Seila has provided tangible goods, such as bridges, roads, and wells, to the
population, there is little quantifiable evidence to suggest that it has had
a quantifiable impact on poverty. Rudengren and Ojendal (2002, 34)
conclude the following:
For a major development program on poverty alleviation to not be able to
account for quantifiable advances in poverty reduction, after five years of
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Table 4.1 Financial Support to CARERE and Seila, 1992–2001
Donor 1992–93 1994–95 1996–98 1999–2001 Total Percent
UN System
UNDP 4,744,000 7,085,000 17,810,000 4,862,000 34,501,000 33.3
UNCDF 0 0 1,988,000 2,042,000 4,030,000 3.9
UNWFP 0 0 0 2,860,000 2,860,000 2.8
UNHCR 2,627,000 0 0 340,000 2,988,000 2.9
Subtotal 7,392,000 7,085,000 19,797,000 10,105,000 44,379,000 42.8 
Bilateral donors
Australia 0 476,000 0 820,000 1,296,000 1.2
Canada/IDRC 0 0 226,000 100,000 326,000 0.3
Caisse 0 791,000 0 0 791,000 0.8
Française
EU 0 0 2,893,000 0 2,893,000 2.8
Finland 449,000 0 0 0 449,000 0.4
Netherlands 1,768,000 3,421,000 6,050,000 4,463,000 15,702,000 15.1
Norway 0 915,000 0 00 0 0.9
Sweden 0 1,459,000 13,436,000 5,653,000 20,548,000 19.8
United 125,000 0 236,000 950,000 1,311,000 1.3
Kingdom/
DFID
United States 1,780,000 0 0 0 1,780,000 1.7
Subtotal 4,121,000 7,062,000 22,840,000 11,986,000 46,010,000 44.4
International financial institutions
IFAD 0 0 0 5,700,000 5,700,000 5.5
World Bank 0 0 0 4,099,000 4,099,000 4.0
Subtotal 0 0 0 9,799,000 9,799,000 9.4
Domestic resources
Local 
contributions 0 0 400,000 920,000 1,320,000 1.3
National 
budget 0 0 0 2,191,000 2,191,000 2.1
Subtotal 0 0 400,000 3,111,000 3,511,000 3.4
Total 11,513,000 14,147,000 43,038,000 35,001,000 103,699,000 100
Source: UNDP 2001.
Note: EU = European Union, IDRC = International Development Research Centre, IFAD = International Fund for
Agricultural Development, UNWFP = United Nations World Food Programme.
operation, may seem devastating. This certainly has been controversial,
endlessly noted in monitoring reports, and a constant concern of donors.
Some more targeted attempts at poverty alleviation for particularly dis-
advantaged groups have been attempted, but with limited success. The
explanation for the relative indifference for more tangible poverty alle-
viation is, firstly, that the program works on a structural level with
state–civil society relations and through addressing issues pertaining to
social fragmentation, and is thus only indirectly addressing poverty.
Second, small-scale infrastructure investments have received the bulk of
the investment budget. Thus poverty is targeted. Third, poverty is an elu-
sive concept—although income level may not have risen across the
board in the concerned areas, life has probably become easier (through
feeder roads), health is likely to have increased (through better access to
water and clinics), or basic education been raised (through more schools
being built), and so forth.
Seila was reoriented at an early stage toward governance rather than
direct poverty alleviation. The presupposition of the Seila philosophy is
the claim that poverty alleviation is best approached by promoting partic-
ipation, transparency, and accountability in government. Evaluating Seila
on its own terms suggests that the best indication of its utility to the poor
is the extent to which the poor are empowered by Seila processes and the
extent to which the needs they express are met through the Seila system.
More broadly, the question is whether the governance approach is an
appropriate means of tackling poverty in early postconflict situations.
Qualitative assessments of Seila’s impact on village politics and on the
extent to which the process offers opportunities for the poor to partici-
pate have been undertaken. The findings offer only equivocal evidence of
a positive impact. One study, conducted in 1999/2000, concluded that
“Seila’s impact on local governance is largely determined by local power
relations,” that where Seila had an effect, it was due to the fact that
the program exposed villagers to actors from outside and prompted
the emergence of new leaders.The study argued that “Seila can contribute
to active citizenship if people are aware of their rights and responsibil-
ities, that Seila can contribute to establishing accountable village repre-
sentatives with a limited mandate, and that Seila can strengthen commune
governance if other actors do not counteract that objective” (Hasselskog,
Krong, and Chim 2000, 11). These results suggest that Seila has an
effect on state–society relations but that it is highly qualified by inci-
dental factors.
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A 2001 study on the impact of Seila on the involvement of civil soci-
ety in local governance found that villagers were aware of Seila activities
in their own village but were less well aware of activities taking place at
the commune level, thus limiting their ability to demand accountability
from commune-level officials (Biddulph 2001). A 2003 study on the
implications of Seila for empowerment of villagers suggested that aware-
ness of the importance of the commune level of government had grown
in Cambodian villages (Biddulph 2003, 10). The study also reported
widespread participation in planning, along with satisfaction with project
choice and anticipation of benefiting from projects implemented. These
findings suggest that elites have not captured the Seila process, a finding
backed up by other research. However, the empowerment study also
found generally low awareness of the nuts and bolts of the planning
process, poor availability of detailed information, dissatisfaction among
officials with training processes, and some concerns over technical stan-
dards that may result from “collaboration between contractors and
provincial technical officers” (Biddulph 2003, 7). In other words, Seila has
delivered tangible, popular, and useful benefits to villagers, including the
very poor, in response to articulated needs, but it has been less successful
in delivering transparency, accountability, and, consequently, empower-
ment with respect to commune, district, and provincial government. This
has significant repercussions with regard to local ownership.
A significant finding of these studies is that villagers were much more
likely to take ownership of local projects if they had made a financial con-
tribution. The Seila process allows for mobilization of local contributions
toward development projects. This finding raises the question of whether
the Seila framework’s overall orientation toward the disbursement of
donor funds could not have been better linked to the gathering of local
contributions and whether a spillover effect of having done so might have
raised more urgent attention on the part of central government to issues
of revenue raising by local governments.
Another issue is the emergence of a village-based civil society.Arguably,
the input of villagers into state planning processes might be more effective
if it were channeled through community-based organizations. The partic-
ipatory planning processes of the Seila program offer opportunities for
community-based organizations to come to the table. They also offer
opportunities for NGOs to engage in commune-level affairs (through the
district integration workshops) and for links to be formed between grass-
roots organizations and national and international NGOs. Attention has
been paid, at least in the original provinces supported by Seila, to forming
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and strengthening elected village development committees to represent
grassroots community interests. It is unclear, however, whether members
of these committees represent a range of village interests and concerns;
their relationship with the village and commune authorities is highly
variable (Hasselskog, Krong, and Chim 2000). The Seila program did not
allocate resources directly to strengthening community-based organiza-
tions representing sectional interests. Fostering local interest groups—by
offering arenas within which the needs, concerns, and preferences of dif-
ferent villagers can be defined and developed—could improve the quality
of planning outcomes.
The relationship between Seila structures and longstanding civil
(rather than governmental) authority structures within villages is also
unclear. The lack of community-based organizations may have con-
tributed to difficulties in disseminating information about Seila activities
and procedures at the village level. Efforts have been made to involve
local pagodas—a focus of civil society in rural Cambodia villages—in
Seila activities. A 2001 study reported that there had been some success
in eliciting the assistance of monks in mobilizing contributions for Seila
projects but less success in using monks as advisors or facilitators
(Biddulph 2001).
The 2004 Mid-Term Review of the Seila/PLG project partly frees
Seila from the need to show evidence of an impact on poverty reduction.
The review notes that Seila aims to reduce poverty by improving gover-
nance and that the government and PLG donors had agreed that “the
Seila program would not produce its own poverty strategy, but instead
would define an approach for how to contribute to and strengthen the
implementation of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003–05.”
(SPM Consultants and Oxford Policy Management 2004, 15). The
reviewers note that Seila processes have the potential to be pro-poor.
“The modest financial resources that have been provided through the
Commune/Sangkat Fund, promoted and supported by the Seila program,
may be allocated in a way that ensures that at least some of the benefits
reach the very poor, though this is far from automatic” (SPM Consultants
and Oxford Policy Management 2004, 15).
The report also notes that guidelines for the district integration work-
shops reflect the strategic objectives of the government’s National Poverty
Reduction Strategy, as do guidelines for allocation of Provincial Investment
Funds.3 However, the report notes, decentralization policies are not likely
to reduce poverty significantly, because the funds transferred to com-
mune councils are meager and there is little downward accountability.
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No quantifiable evidence is available on Seila’s overall contribution to
economic growth. However, it is clear that Seila has channeled money
into useful projects. Cambodia emerged from the civil war with a shat-
tered infrastructure. The provision of basic infrastructure—bridges, wells,
schools—is likely to have provided significant benefit to the communities.
Qualitative studies suggest that these benefits extended to the very poor
(Biddulph 2003).
Impact on Governance
In line with the reorientation of Seila’s approach away from poverty
reduction toward improved governance, the conclusions of the Mid-Term
Review of February 2004 focus on governance outcomes. The review
suggests that successes have been achieved in several areas such as these:
• “relevance . . . [in] contributing to improved governance, service deliv-
ery and poverty reduction”
• “effectiveness” in providing technical assistance at the provincial
level, although this aid was constrained by a lack of a clear govern-
ment policy framework determining the powers and functions of
provincial governments
• timeliness in implementing program activities
• an “impression” of “significant positive impact on the government’s
decentralization program . . . less so with respect to promoting decon-
centration”
• significant strengthening of capacities and improvement of systems for
accountability and transparency
The review also notes a high level of dependence on donor financial and
technical assistance support, which is expected to continue for a number
of years.
With regard to attitudes and governance, it is difficult to separate the
particular contribution of Seila from other motors driving political and
administrative change. The Cambodian government has officially stated
that it regards Seila as supportive of deconcentration and decentralization.
It considers Seila a laboratory in which policies can be experimented
with, one that provides a database and a body of experience.
However, there are wider political issues within which any contribution
from Seila must be framed. Although already enacted decentralization
policies for introducing elected local bodies at the commune level bear
Seila’s imprint, policies for devolving central government powers to the
provincial and district level are still in the earliest stages of development.
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Seila’s role in this process is unclear. Important actors in the policy-making
process are not convinced that Seila should be viewed as the template for
wider deconcentration reform.
More problematic is establishing evidence for less-tangible outcomes,
such as the sustainability of capacity built at the provincial, district, and
commune levels; the democratic attitudes promoted among the population
and local government; and the significance of Seila in driving govern-
ment policy making. Providing evidence for these outcomes—particularly
evidence for changing attitudes on the part of government and the
population—is difficult, not only because of the intangible nature of these
outcomes but also because Seila was implemented in the context of wider
political, social, and economic changes over the course of the 1990s.
Analyzing the success of Seila in these cases requires examining the
political economy of the situation within which Seila has been imple-
mented, the incentive structures of key actors, and the ways in which
Seila has fitted into or transformed them. Such an approach offers insight
into the extent to which Seila has had an impact that is likely to be valued
highly enough to promote changed behavior and far-reaching enough to
prove sustainable over the long run.
Reform of Provincial Government 
The initial impetus for CARERE 2/Seila emerged in response to exper-
imentation under CARERE 1 in the northwestern provinces, which were
heavily hit by fighting during the civil war and remained divided into
government and insurgent zones until the end of the war. The earliest
village development councils and provincial rural development commit-
tees were piloted there, under the auspices of CARERE and the Ministry
of Rural Development. CARERE 1 developed a close relationship with
five provincial administrations, in an environment where provincial gover-
nors had recently lost considerable power because of rapid centralization
under the terms of the 1993 Constitution. To promote macroeconomic
stability, the government has pursued fiscal centralization since 1993,
thus depriving provincial governments of revenue. In the northwestern
provinces in particular, institutions for managing rural development in the
context of ongoing war, the regular displacement of population, and the
return of thousands of refugees were not merely lacking but absent.
Seila’s success in reforming provincial government emerged to a great
extent from this context. Seila was successful because it provided funding
and functions to a level of government that had lost its purpose. Provincial
governors in the northwest faced a difficult political and economic situation.
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They were under pressure from two directions. National reform toward
elections and subsequent political instability meant that their positions—
and those of their parties—were highly uncertain. Within their provinces,
they were under pressure to maintain control of government zones in the
face of continued armed insurgency, inflowing refugees and ongoing dis-
placement, and minimal financial flows. Rapid economic reform away
from the command economy toward a free market and the centralization
of revenue raising had altered the policy context for development beyond
recognition. At the same time, inflows of aid were almost uniformly
bypassing the state. In the early 1990s, the majority of rural development
work in the northwestern provinces was being delivered by NGOs that
dealt with local associations as partners. The current governor of Pursat
and former governor of Battambang was interviewed for this study and
commented, “NGOs used to come here to do projects and we didn’t
know about it.” Some reports suggest that a similar situation existed
between the provincial governor’s office and the provincial offices of line
ministries. The relations between these agencies varied considerably from
province to province.
In this context, provincial governors needed to find a way to reassert
their authority with respect to other political and economic actors, to
legitimize their position with respect to a more politically diverse popu-
lation through the provision of tangible benefits, to stave off economic
disaster and popular disaffection, and to give them some flexibility to
react to the unfolding situation. The Seila program—which offered dis-
cretionary local development funds, mechanisms for managing them, a
role in coordinating nongovernmental development initiatives, and new
participatory institutions that could bind villagers to the state—fitted well
with the needs of provincial governments. In the CARERE 2/Seila phase,
in particular, Seila mechanisms also offered some of the only neutral
ground for engagement between provincial administrations and the
newly integrated zones that had been administered by insurgents during
the civil war. In the two provinces visited for this study, Kompong Cham
and Pursat, senior staff members emphasized the importance of Seila in
giving the provincial government a role, allocating resources to them, and
restoring their authority over other development actors.
This situation was conducive to success from the perspective of both
provincial governors and donors. A lack of pre-existing rural development
practices, the extreme dearth of local finance, and the strong incentives
for cooperation on the part of provincial government gave maximum
leverage to donors. As a result, they were able to engage state actors in
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intensive training and to insist that detailed mechanisms for planning, pro-
curement, management, and financing be followed. Given the wide-
spread mistrust among donors of the Cambodian state apparatus and its
rapidly growing reputation for corruption and politicization, this was an
important element in attracting donors to both offer funds to the core of
the Seila program and, increasingly, to channel supplementary funding
through the Seila framework.
With regard to the possibility of political hijacking or elite capture,
Seila benefited from the fact that it began life as a program operating pri-
marily at the provincial level, with small-scale funding. During the early
to mid-1990s, the provincial level was much less politicized than the
national level of government. During CARERE 1 and the early years of
CARERE 2 until the national elections of 1998, the national level of pol-
itics was driven by internal tension between the partners in the coalition
government, the National Front for an Independent, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Cambodian People’s
Party (CPP). The Seila Task Force—the national body managing policy
making for Seila—was convened in December 1997, after the July battle
in which the CPP defeated FUNCINPEC armed forces and before the
return of many of the FUNCINPEC and opposition politicians who fled
Cambodia in the aftermath of that battle. Furthermore, even once estab-
lished, the Seila Task Force lagged behind provincial and local actors who
were already driving the program. An evaluation of Seila conducted in
2000 found that the national-level Seila Task Force was the least effective
of the various levels of government with regard to their Seila roles (Evans
et al. 2000, 2).
Part of the reason for Seila’s success has been the fact that it began life
below the political radar, at a level of government that was removed
somewhat from the heat of political wrangling. Seila’s initial disbursements
of funds were too small to be the target of attempts at elite capture on a
large scale. As one interviewee put it, “By the time the funding had
reached a significant level, the accountability mechanisms were in place.”
Accountability mechanisms are a major issue, given the high level of
corruption within the Cambodian state apparatus and the disastrous
effect that corruption has had on a large number of donor-sponsored
development and resource management projects.4
The nature of these successes, however, provokes another question.
Given that Seila fitted neatly with the needs of provincial governors, to
what extent did Seila actually foster change within provincial govern-
ments? A number of evaluations have concluded that Seila has fostered
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change, a conclusion enthusiastically endorsed by the governor of Pursat,
who asserted, “The Seila program has changed my life.” Proponents of
Seila argue that the learning-by-doing approach offered an expression of
trust in the state, to which a state hungry for increased legitimacy and the
capacity to be more effective eagerly responded (Rudengren and Ojendal
2002). Some people interviewed for this study also suggested that the
discretion awarded to state actors over Seila funds increased the sense of
ownership. According to one of them, there is a crucial difference in the
way that local level officials talk about projects produced with Seila funds
and projects delivered by external agencies. “They say, this road is the
ADB road, but that road is our road.”
Provincial governments across Cambodia have been implicated in a
range of corrupt and abusive activities. One person interviewed for this
study quoted a provincial governor as saying, “Provincial governors
have two hats, a black one and a white one. When we work with Seila
we wear our white hats.” This quote raises the question of how far the
response to Seila has prompted spillover into wider governmental atti-
tudes and how far it is simply a response prompted by the particular
conditions of Seila funding. This question is difficult to answer. Several
evaluations have noted that the attitudes of provincial officials have
been transformed by Seila, with provincial government becoming
more responsive and self-reliant (Evans et al. 2000, 16; see also
Rudengren and Ojendal 2002, 16). But a survey conducted in 2001
among government officials in Seila and non-Seila provinces suggested
that there was little difference between them in terms of government
officials’ understanding of international definitions of good governance
(Holloway and others 2001).
The survey found that Cambodian government officials generally fall
short of international standards. It noted, however, that “there are some
systems, for example, the Seila program, which have demonstrated that
transparency in governance and development is possible at a cost.
Officials who work in Seila systems meet this standard” (Holloway and
others 2001, 46). This survey suggests that while attitudes toward good
governance across Seila and non-Seila provinces might be monolithic,
practices are not. The maintenance of such practices is vitally depend-
ent on their continued support and monitoring through the system.
Salary supplements and ongoing supervision by PLG advisors represent
two examples of support that keep Seila officials on the straight and
narrow. But has there has been any spillover? Have attitudes changed
fundamentally—or just in line with current Seila incentives? Are the
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capacities and structures built through Seila sustainable in the absence
of this kind of ongoing support?
The business of working through the annual round of Seila planning
and management mechanisms has undoubtedly changed the framework
within which provincial government operates, making the “white hat”
approach to government possible. New institutions have been created,
notably the village, commune, and provincial rural development commit-
tees, that permit the circulation of information upward from the grassroots
and horizontally between provincial government and line departments.
Coordination has been facilitated by an increase in mutual understanding
of concerns and interests and by the establishment of personal relation-
ships between different actors in the system. Seila funds give the provin-
cial governments the ability to formulate plans and, to a limited extent, a
vision of the future development trajectory of the province. As provincial
staff in the two provinces visited (Kompong Cham and Pursat) made clear,
this formulation expands the independence, authority, and effectiveness of
provincial government, and it permits governors to enjoy a sense of job sat-
isfaction and popularity with the people.
Since 1993 the electoral strategy of the current ruling party has been
heavily dependent on the ability of the ruling party to raise large sums of
money to sponsor politicized, party-owned rural development projects,
which are used to garner votes at election times. Provincial governors are
required to contribute both to raising the necessary funds, through a range
of practices associated with corruption and natural resource exploitation,
and to promoting the politicization of much government-sponsored rural
development. There is little sign that the ruling party is rethinking this
electoral strategy. The continuation of this side of provincial governance
casts some doubt over whether the relative transparency and accountabil-
ity with which Seila operates remains a function of close scrutiny by PLG
advisors rather than changed attitudes within provincial government.This
question will become acute in the future as Seila processes become fur-
ther mainstreamed and as the proportion of provincial funding channeled
through the processes increases.
Associated with this debate is another over whether Seila has set up
parallel structures. Proponents of Seila point to the fact that it is almost
unprecedented in Cambodian rural development to work through the
state and, in particular, to trust the state with funds. The program’s
learning-by-doing approach, which held that state actors had to be given
budgets in order to learn how to use them, has been hailed as both revo-
lutionary and progressive. Seila’s advocates also point out that the so-called
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Table 4.2 Financial Support to Seila, 2001–05
Seila Program 2001–2005: Donor Financing
Donor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total Percent
National Budget – Royal Government of Cambodia 1,447,368 6,017,248 11,312,282 13,041,814 14,959,567 46,778,279 27.5
Multilateral Grants 10,095,820 11,658,737 14,364,690 15,413,768 14,696,596 666,229,611 39.0
UN-Donor Partnership for Local Governance 5,695,820 6,569,647 11,113,516 11,649,684 12,240,223 47,268,890 27.8
UN World Food Program 4,400,000 4,706,090 2,307,210 2,546,845 13,960,145 8.2
UNICEF/Seth Koma 340,000 918,964 1,217,239 2,206,373 4,682,576 2.8
UNDP/DSP 250,000 250,000 0.1
UNV/Community Development in Angkor Park 43,000 25,000 68,000 0.0
Bilateral Grants 1,263,400 2,004,187 3,320,979 4,928,617 3,578,681 115,095,864 8.9
Germany/GTZ 1,113,400 1,700,000 1,905,126 2,056,153 1,110,102 7,884,781 4.6
Australia/AusAID 150,000 150,000 1,022,858 766,634 436,135 2,525,627 1.5
Denmark/DANIDA 392,995 2,105,830 1,232,444 3,731,269 2.2
Japan/Small Grants Facility 154,187 154,187 0.1
Canada/CIDA 800,000 800,000 0.5
Loan Programs 4,964,488 5,033,449 7,769,436 12,004,944 11,296,724 441,069,041 24.2
IFAD/ADESS 1,735,081 2,261,508 1,780,843 1,172,966 756,799 7,707,197 4.5
IFAD/CBRD 2,131,330 2,771,941 2,988,593 4,068,622 2,360,465 14,320,951 8.4
IFAD/RPRP 1,515,156 2,866,860 4,382,016 2.6
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International Fund for Agricultural Development Total 3,866,411 5,033,449 4,769,436 6,756,744 5,984,124 426,410,164 15.5
World Bank/RILGa 3,000,000 5,248,200 5,312,600 13,560,800 8.0
World Bank/NVDP 500,000 500,000 0.3
World Bank/Social Fund of the Kingdom of Cambodia 598,077 598,077 0.4
World Bank Total 1,098,077 3,000,000 5,248,200 5,312,600 14,658,877 8.6
NGO and Private Sector Grants 292,583 160,000 343,000 795,583 0.5
AustCARE 143,000 143,000 0.1
GRET 85,000 20,000 105,000 0.1
Concern 323,000 323,000 0.2
Private Donation 149,583 75,000 224,583 0.1
Source: Table provided by Partnership for Local Governance (2005). 
Note: ADESS = Agriculture Development Support to Seila; CBRD = Community Based Rural Development; RPRP = Rural Poverty Reduction Project;
GTZ = German Agency for Technical Cooperation; CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency; DANIDA = Danish International Development Agency; UNDP = UN Development
Programme; RILG = Rural Investment and Local Governance; NVDP = Northeast Village Development Project; blank cells = zero.
a. World Bank reimbursements to CS Fund included under both RGC and WB/RILG but subtracted from total to avoid double counting.
Seila institutions, such as the provincial rural development committee and
the commune development committee, are staffed by members of the
respective levels of government. The 2004 Mid-Term Review suggested
that the question of parallel structures could be resolved simply by
“debranding”: Seila structures are called Seila because they were originally
associated with the Seila project. Now that mainstreaming has proceeded
sufficiently, this notion of separation should be abandoned. Critics have
argued that Seila impinges on the mandate of the Ministry for Rural
Development and captures rural development funds for capital projects
that could be better spent raising salaries and promoting capacity within
ministry line departments (Batkin 2001). They argue that Seila is
ringfenced, to an extent, from the broader business of provincial govern-
ment, because many Seila funds are off budget.
With the exception of contributions to the Commune/Sangkat Fund’s
treasury account, the bulk of Seila funds are off-budget transfers, which
are maintained and handled separately from other financial flows, and
accountable to donors. However, the deconcentration of functions is
likely to bring Seila mechanisms into the heart of subnational financing.
Given the notorious politicization of the Cambodian state and the ten-
dency to skim budgets to pay for items such as election campaigning, the
delivery of mainstream government budgets through the Seila-type
mechanisms will constitute a significant test of the integrity of these
mechanisms. Corruption in Cambodia is systemic and institutionalized.
The pressure on provincial governments to deliver political support at
crucial times runs counter to the Seila ethos and makes it difficult for
provincial governors to “switch hats” easily. Seila offers an opportunity
for donors to increase their monitoring of government practices and to
reorient them toward a more transparent and accountable system.
However, given that to a great extent corruption in the Cambodian gov-
ernment forms the basis of the current social and political order, resistance
to such monitoring and reorientation can reasonably be expected once
Seila is mainstreamed.
Seila staff are currently motivated by the payment of salary supple-
ments. This is regarded as indispensable to ensure “efficient and honest
performance” (SPM Consultants and Oxford Policy Management, 2004,
3). A key issue affecting all donor programs in Cambodia is the fact that
since 1993, civil service salaries have been so derisory that civil servants
frequently spend most, if not all, of their time away from their posts doing
other jobs. Salary supplements ensure regular attendance, the essential
prerequisite for any kind of institutional functioning. Combined with
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ongoing supervision by PLG, they represent the “carrot and stick” used to
limit attempts at siphoning off Seila funds. Reliance on salary supplements,
however, raises the question of how Seila mechanisms can be main-
streamed. Unless there is a significant increase in civil service salaries
generally—something that donors are currently promoting but that the
government has resisted—it is unclear how the level of efficiency and
integrity currently attained by Seila processes can be continued.
Donors are active participants in and proponents of Seila, particularly
through the PLG, although functions initially performed by expatriates
have by and large been taken over by national staff members who are paid
by donors. Were donor input to decline, it is unclear whether the staff
administering Seila processes would continue to retain authority over them
or whether the staff or the processes they administer would be sidelined.
In brief, Seila’s successes in terms of governance outcomes are to a
great extent the result of the way the program was slotted into the polit-
ical and economic context of northwest Cambodia in the early to mid-
1990s. The program responded to the incentive structures of provincial
governments and was able to entrench its own working practices in newly
forming institutions within the state. However, close scrutiny by PLG
advisors has created a firewall between Seila institutions and funds and
other institutions and funds within provincial governments. If this firewall
were removed, by either the mainstreaming of Seila processes or a decline
in donor interest, it is unclear whether the habits, training, and advantages
offered by Seila would trump the systemic and institutional dynamics of
corruption that are pervasive in the Cambodian state apparatus. The
assertions in the 2004 Mid-Term Review that continued donor support
will be required for many years and that PLG monitoring of transparen-
cy and accountability are key to Seila’s success suggest that the program’s
spillover effects remain uncertain.
Impact on Commune Government
Seila has played a significant role at the commune level, a level of
government that was in significant ways reinvented in the 1990s. The
precise role of commune government was unclear in the 1990s and
varied from commune to commune. The 1993 Constitution specified
the commune level as the lowest level of government, thus removing
the village as a legal or administrative entity. In 2002 commune elections
were held, replacing the old appointed commune chiefs with new
(or in many cases the same) elected commune chiefs and commune
councils.
The Seila Program in Cambodia 111
Under CARERE 1 and 2, participatory planning processes were con-
ducted with village-based, elected village development committees. With
the election of commune councils, the village development committees
have become the central actors in participatory planning. This process
makes sense in the context of democratization, because it aligns represen-
tation, participation, and accountability within Seila mechanisms with
the broader electoral regime. It contrasts, however, with survey findings
on the perceptions of voters. Seila’s own evaluations have regularly shown
that villagers tend to have a strongly village-focused perspective. One
study of these attitudes, conducted after the commune elections in 2003,
found that villagers were more likely now than previously to suggest that
the commune level of government might be responsible for various devel-
opment activities, representing a heightened profile for commune govern-
ment. The same study, however, found that most villagers were unaware
that there was a commune council or what it did (Biddulph 2003).
Commune government, to a great extent, must be invented. Seila may
have allowed commune councilors and chiefs to build on their higher
profile following the elections by providing a set of processes to access a
Commune/Sangkat Fund for local development. Through participatory
planning, commune councils have an opportunity to interact with their
electorates and to build accountable relationships with them.
There have been certain difficulties, however, with this approach. A
frequent criticism of the Seila program has been that its procedures are
time-consuming and cumbersome and tax the capacities of both com-
mune officials and villagers.5 This is particularly the case when the possi-
bility for funding all aspects of the commune’s plans is uncertain. Field
visits to Kompong Cham and Pursat Provinces revealed anecdotal evidence
of ennui in Pursat but not in Kompong Cham. Both the marginal utility
of going through the process of participatory planning (in terms of gain-
ing information about villages and their needs and gaining status and
legitimacy in the eyes of constituents) and the marginal utility of the proj-
ects delivered in response are likely to decline over time. Set against this,
however, is the claim that villagers get into the habit of being consulted
on development projects and that this habit is difficult to break once
established. Evidence backing up this claim is sparse.
Promotion of Decentralization and Deconcentration
An evaluation by SIDA noted that “the CARERE 2/Seila program has
itself been the catalyst spurring public interest and the government’s
current policy thrust toward deconcentration and decentralization. It has
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done this by creating a model for coordinated planning and development
of communes and provinces and demonstrating that it works” (Evans and
others 2000, 4). While a clear incentive structure may be prompting the
enthusiasm of provincial governors for Seila, the political driving force
behind the Cambodian government’s wider decentralization and decon-
centration policies is less evident.
Decentralization and deconcentration have been on Cambodia’s polit-
ical reform agenda since the mid-1990s. Overall, progress in fulfilling
this agenda has been slow. Decentralization took a leap forward with the
holding of commune elections in 2002. But subsequent action in devolving
significant powers to the commune level and establishing a sound basis
for local revenue raising by commune councils has been limited. One
person interviewed for this study, a member of the Decentralization and
Deconcentration Working Group, described the current mood in govern-
ment as one of consolidation with respect to decentralization.
Given the landslide victory of the CPP in the 2002 commune elec-
tions, it is tempting to regard this effort at decentralization as political
opportunism. The replacement of appointed commune chiefs with
elected councils was tentatively slated for 1996 but repeatedly post-
poned. When elections finally occurred, most observers regarded them
as a credible step forward in democratization, but it was clear that
significant benefits accrued to the CPP by virtue of its increasingly firm
grip on power.6 The elections were well timed and delivered political
benefits to the ruling party, and they went some way toward meeting the
expectations of democracy promoters at home and abroad. However,
studies since 2002 have suggested that the quality of the relationship
between villagers and commune authorities has changed since the
elections. Studies have noted increased awareness of commune govern-
ment on the part of villagers, increased accountability of commune
authorities to villagers, and cross-party solidarity within commune coun-
cils with respect to higher levels of government (Biddulph 2003; Rusten
and others 2004; Hughes and Sedara 2004).
Seila’s stated role is to provide experience and expertise in support of
decentralization and deconcentration policy making. A subdecree issued
in June 2001, laying out the role of the Seila Task Force, defines this role
as supporting the “design of decentralized and deconcentrated mecha-
nisms and systems to manage sustainable local development” and the
undertaking of “human resource development for decentralized and
deconcentrated mechanisms and systems implementation within the
Seila framework.” One key achievement of the Seila program, according
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to one person interviewed for this study, is the fact that it offered a safe
environment for experimentation and risk taking. In highly politicized
postconflict situations, the tolerance for government officials who cham-
pion policies that later turn out to have been misguided is very limited.
This tolerence militates against innovative and experimental attitudes
within government. Seila was useful in advancing the agenda for decen-
tralization and deconcentration because it illustrated that participatory
planning and decentralized management of development projects could
work without being politically threatening.
Seila undertook a number of activities with respect to decentralization.
It funded technical assistance to the National Council for the Support of
Communes to develop regulations and guidelines for their use. Donor-
financed support through Seila continues to test and evaluate these sys-
tems. Seila implemented training courses for commune councils and
clerks. It revised the design of Seila structures at the provincial level to
transfer responsibilities for commune capacity building to the provincial
offices of local administration, established under the Ministry of Interior,
taking them away from the Ministry of Rural Development. The
Commune/Sangkat Fund, which was disbursed to commune councils
from the central government as their primary source of funding, evolved
from the local development funds piloted by Seila, initially with grants
from the UN Capital Development Fund. In these respects, Seila operates
as a source of capacity building, piloting, and design innovation, upon
which government has drawn in framing decentralization processes.
Deconcentration has been slower to unfold. Some ministries, notably
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, have already decon-
centrated their functions to a significant degree. But the overall framework
for deconcentrating power and distributing power between agencies at the
provincial and district levels has not been established. Several people inter-
viewed for this study put forward sound pragmatic reasons for advancing
with caution. One is concern over the viability of communes at their cur-
rent size, particularly if communes are given revenue collection duties.
Another is concern over the capacity of local government and the fear
of overstretching Seila/PLG, which has just expanded to cover all 24
provinces and municipalities, without a concomitant increase in the
administrative staff.
Substantial disagreements have arisen between national ministries
regarding the appropriate nature of future arrangements; some observers
have suggested that Seila itself is a bone of contention. At the national
level, the Seila Task Force, with its mandate for generating policy for
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decentralized government in pursuit of poverty alleviation, overlaps with
other agencies established to oversee local government, namely, the
Council for Administrative Reform, the National Council for the Support
of Communes, and the Department of Local Administration within the
Ministry of Interior. This overlap is said to make it difficult to determine
who has responsibility for taking the lead in promoting deconcentration
policies and formulating organic law. While there may be some overlap at
the national level, this overlap is far less the case at the provincial level,
where, for example, the Provincial Office of Local Administration—
reporting to the Department of Local Administration—is likely to be
staffed by the same people as the local administration unit that supports
Seila’s ExCom.
It is too early to say whether Seila will have a significant effect on the
form of the government’s deconcentration strategy or what that effect will
be, although plans are already being drawn up to determine what kind of
role Seila could play. It is clear, however, that Seila is well positioned to play
a key role in deconcentration, and it is likely that many of Seila’s working
practices will find their way into the eventual deconcentration schema.
Overall Assessment
Measuring Seila’s success in terms of delivered outcomes and spillovers is
problematic in that the program has tended to reinvent itself in accor-
dance with spillovers as they arise and, in doing so, has moved away from
tangible development goals toward intangible ones. While a number of
evaluators have been highly impressed by the extent to which the pro-
gram has promoted changed attitudes on the part of provincial officials,
it is difficult to pin this contribution down. Qualitative studies aiming to
establish the extent to which Seila has provided intangible goods, such as
empowerment and good governance, have tended to find only sketchy
evidence. Where attitudes seem to have changed, it has frequently been
because a supportive incentive structure has been created (for example,
by paying salary supplements to government officials). It is difficult to
find hard evidence of sustainable change.
In the short term, Seila has clearly contributed to improved provincial
and commune governance. It has created structures for rural infrastruc-
ture delivery where they did not exist. Through these structures, Seila has
delivered rural infrastructure that benefits the very poor. It has trained
thousands of civil servants and elected people’s representatives in mech-
anisms for implementing development projects in a manner that is
acceptable to donors and is likely to elicit further funds from them. It has
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offered opportunities for provincial governments to regain authority over
development processes, following the free-for-all of the early 1990s. Finally,
it has created opportunities for donors to coordinate with one another
and for all development actors to coordinate with village-produced devel-
opment plans and to align them with the National Poverty Reduction
Strategy. It has achieved all of these things in a manner that is viewed by
donors as transparent and noncorrupt. There is some doubt, however, as
to the extent to which villagers have been empowered by these systems.
The test for Seila will be whether it can maintain its integrity once
funding moves on budget, evaluation and monitoring regimes weaken,
and support for incentives such as salary supplements tails off.
Implications for Design and Implementation 
Seila has succeeded to a great extent by virtue of its flexibility and its abil-
ity to mainstream areas in which it has had the most impact, to make
incremental shifts over time into new areas, and, in so doing, to contin-
ue to provide incentives for government to remain engaged. This success
suggests that initial questions of design were less important than the
willingness and ability to redesign opportunistically in the light of the
changing context.
This conclusion is important in a postconflict society for two major
reasons. First, the nature of politics in postconflict societies is such that
prominent programs channeling donor funds are likely to be the target of
a great deal of local attention, of attempts at co-optation or elite capture
of resources, and of contestation for control. Seila avoided these pitfalls
by growing incrementally from a modest program in terms of scope and
resources into a national program with major implications for the future
direction of government policy.
Second, by virtue of a number of fortunate factors—the accumulation
of 16 years’ worth of UNDP funding for Cambodia and the willingness
of particular donors to experiment—the program avoided overmanage-
ment and was able to evolve through experimentation and feedback
rather than through the application of a tested methodology for deliv-
ering agreed-upon outputs from the beginning. While accountability
demands that delivered outcomes be measured, truly experimental pro-
grams are constrained only by the need to stick rigidly to initial project
documents. The Seila program’s willingness to shed goals and adopt
new ones makes its success difficult to quantify, but it allowed the
program to experiment.
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At the same time, the basic themes of the Seila program—learning-by-
doing, using intensive efforts at capacity building, are placing high value
on engagement with the state apparatus—have been apparent from the
start.These aspects of the program appeared risky initially, given the deep
distrust of state structures on the part of donors in the early 1990s. With
hindsight, however, an appreciation of the dire situation facing provincial
governments in Cambodia in the early to mid-1990s suggests that Seila
was, in part, successful because it intervened at a level of government
where donor-state relations were most inclined toward donors. Strong
incentives to cooperate in order to obtain money, training, and authority
permitted Seila to establish and enforce exemplary mechanisms for
ensuring that provincial governors’ experiments with donor funding were
kept broadly within the parameters of donors’ perceptions of legitimate
expenditure. The theme of state engagement subsequently emerged as
highly significant to the program’s success, especially once political ten-
sions at the national level were reduced. Donors, meanwhile, gained a
channel through which both funds and ideas could be coordinated and
disseminated to a level that was far more receptive to donor exhortations
than the national level, particularly in the mid-1990s.
To a great extent, then, design and implementation were not discrete
phases of the program but rather intertwined. The overall project design
and the design of individual elements, such as the detailed procedures for
planning and project management, changed in response to implementa-
tion difficulties and successes as well as to the changing context.
Modifications to the initial program included changes in response to
donor priorities, as exemplified by the shift from CARERE 1’s emphasis
on the rehabilitation of vulnerable refugees to CARERE 2’s capacity-
building focus to the PLG’s focus on feeding into decentralization
policies for the future. The incorporation of National Poverty Reduction
Strategy priorities into Seila guidelines is another example of flexible
adaptation. By offering a channel through which donors could convey
their concerns to government and responding to changing donor concerns,
Seila has maintained its relevance and has come to occupy a central place
among donor initiatives in Cambodia.
Conclusion
Seila is a flourishing program, in terms of its political influence, geo-
graphical scope, popularity with donors, and ability to disburse money
effectively to small-scale infrastructural projects that have been designed
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with input from local people. It has transformed provincial government
from complete disarray to a functioning layer of administration, with a
vision for development and a certain degree of funding, capacity, and
institutional structures to implement that vision. Its success is reflected
in the fact that it is increasingly favored by donors as a mechanism for
channeling funds to rural Cambodia and that it is increasingly favored by
government as an arena within which decentralization and deconcentra-
tion policies can be piloted.Whether or not Seila has transformed attitudes
among officials and villagers remains unclear, given that the program
includes strong incentives for compliance.
Much of the program’s success has been the result of its flexibility, its
emphasis on learning-by-doing, and its incremental development. These
features have allowed Seila both to carve out a niche in Cambodia and to
adapt to the context in which it operates. To an extent, Seila’s initial
success was fortuitous. Its learning-by-doing approach and its focus on
process have allowed the program to capitalize on that success by focusing
on areas of greatest strength and adapting to the changing focuses of
donor and government concern.
Several lessons can be drawn for postconflict contexts from Seila’s
experience:
• Flexibility and adaptation are as important as initial design.
• Experimentation and the ability to recognize, promote, and capitalize
on successful experiments are important.
• Identifying and responding to the needs and concerns of stakeholders
are critical to keeping them engaged.
• It is advisable to start with a low level of resources until systems are
firmly in place and then to increase them incrementally.
• It is useful to develop close relationships with key political players at all
levels.
• Intensive and proactive donor input is needed to keep all actors
engaged.
Notes
1. A sangkat is an urban commune, rather like a London borough.
2. In the Cambodian context, the term decentralization is used to refer to the
creation, regulation, and support of elected commune governments; the term
deconcentration is used to refer to the codification of an expanded role for
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provincial and district levels of government. It involves delegating activities
from the central level and establishing funding mechanisms to support such
delegation.
3. The report also notes, however, that the strategies in the National Poverty
Reduction Strategy are very broad.
4. Prominent examples include the Forest Monitoring Project, the Demobilization
Project, and the current scandal over the World Food Program’s Food for Work
Project.
5. Since 2002, these procedures have been adopted by the National Council for
Support to Communes as the mainstream procedures for commune/sangkat-
level financing and have ceased to be specifically Seila processes.
6. For example, the role of the national media in the commune elections was a
significant bone of contention, as less than 3 percent of news coverage of the
elections was devoted to non-CPP parties’ activities, compared with 12 percent
devoted to the CPP and 75 percent to the CPP-led government (National
Democratic Institute 2002).
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